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Abstract: 
In the deconstruction of the neoliberal narrative through immanent critique, we find that it is 
woven from enabling myths that not only support the neoliberal project, but are essential for 
its continued survival.  This research aims to untangle and critically assess three of the core 
enabling myths of neoliberalism through the critical lens of immanent critique.  If we hope to 
redesign our social institutions into structures which support the flourishing on individuals 
and broader society, then we must aim a critical eye toward these enabling myths, debunk, and 
unveil them through immanent critique. 
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 The neoliberal narrative is a (laissez) faire-y tale.  In its deconstruction through 
immanent critique, we find that the neoliberal narrative is woven from enabling myths that 
support the ideology of neoliberalism and are essential for its continued political survival and 
popular support.  This research aims to untangle and critically assess three of the core enabling 
myths of neoliberalism through immanent critique.   
Immanent Critique 
 Immanent critique begins with a description of what the social structure purports to be 
and proceeds by unveiling the true machinations of the system (Antonio 1981). An immanent 
critique of neoliberalism aims to uncover the contradictions embedded within the neoliberal 
social structure of accumulation, contrasting the rhetoric and ideology which supports it 
against the actual mechanics of it.   
 By holding a given society to its own principles and demonstrating where exactly that 
society falls short, immanent critique frames more convincing arguments than criticism which 
holds that society to an external standard.  Using immanent critique allows scholars to avoid 
the charge of intellectual elitism by demonstrating the irrationality of a society's norms and 
practices against the known, understood, and widely accepted standards of that society as 
opposed to appealing to external, perhaps ill-understood, and unfamiliar norms (Sabia 2010). 
 Some scholars argue the introspective evaluation of immanent critique does not go far 
enough.  This is a misunderstanding of immanent critique, which uses the introspective rubric 
only to examine first whether a society, through its power relations, holds different groups to 
different standards; if there is systematic incongruence between the rhetorical expression of 
that society’s value and its practices.  Immanent critique then continues pushing outward by 
critiquing the efficacy, veracity, and contribution to human dignity that those very standards 
espouse (Sabia 2010). 
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The Core Enabling Myths of Neoliberalism 
The neoliberal narrative consists of three well-defined enabling myths:  privatization of 
state provided goods and services, de-regulation of industry, and retrenchment of the welfare 
state.  All three reinforce a central premise:  the locus of control is the individual exercising 
agency through (free) market operations (Dugger 1989).  The myths of privatization and de-
regulation both argue that erecting a wall between government and business creates a more 
efficient market economy; private industry is brought to heel by competitive market forces that 
represent the aggregate of autonomous, individual decisions.  Likewise, the retrenchment of 
the welfare state erects a wall between the individual and the state, which ‘frees’ the individual 
to exercise agency and decide for herself where she wants to reside in the economic hierarchy.   
Core enabling myth #1:  business can do whatever government does better, more efficiently, and cheaper 
The arguments in favor of privatization often include claims that the private sector is 
more efficient – that running operations like a business instead of a bloated bureaucracy 
translates to lower costs, greater efficiency, and a better product or service.  The dangers of such 
practice are ignored.  Moreover, the move to the private sector is incomplete; neoliberal 
“privatization” means that the production or provision of a good or service has been turned 
over to the private sector – while maintaining government funding through state contracts.  
This pseudo-privatization separates the public writ large from private producer with the state 
acting as the financial intermediary, essentially removing public oversight without alleviating 
state spending (Nasser 2003).  Psuedo-privatization demonstrates the contradiction between the 
neoliberal ideal of the small, fiscally responsibility state, and the reality of opaque government 
funding provided to private industry contractors within the neoliberal state.   
When advocates of privatization argue that the private sector runs more efficiently, 
more sleekly than the government, the example of cost cutting is offered as a prime example.  A 
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more accurate way to phrase it would be cost manipulation, as an examination of the private 
prison industry illustrates.   
Privately run prisons have but one customer – the government.   With revenue streams 
secured by government contract, the private prison can widen its profit margins primarily 
through cutting costs. Since physical prison facilities present fixed and substantial costs, the 
remaining variable costs specifically related to labor fall most conveniently under the hatchet.  
In fact, the biggest difference between private and public prisons centers on the staff.  In 
private prisons, there is a high rate of employee turnover, employees receive less training, fewer 
benefits, and are actively discouraged from organizing in trade unions (Ashton 2011). 
Less training means more work-related incidents, which is particularly dangerous in the 
case of prisons, where work-related incidents easily manifest into violent altercations between 
staff and inmates; it should be of little surprise that private prisons experience greater violence, 
more escape attempts, and higher drug usage.  Studies show that private prisons have a higher 
rate (double) of physical incidents between inmates and correction officers even though they 
can be more selective about the type of inmate they house (Ashton 2011).  
Privatization transforms the motive for the provision of public goods and services for 
the welfare of the public into profit-making enterprises.  The generation of profit 
fundamentally changes the mission of any enterprise, which is especially pernicious in the case 
of state provision as the function of the state has a defining mission to serve the public interest 
writ large.  Changing the mission of any enterprise to focus narrowly on the generation of 
profits, changes the incentive structure as well.    
The private prison industry, for instance, isn't solely based on the hope that people will 
commit enough crimes of a sufficiently heinous nature in order to secure consistent profits.  In 
order to insure a steady stream of prisoners, private prison corporations have been active in the 
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legislative process, weighing in on laws that directly impact the bottom line for their business as 
opposed to the safeguarding of public safety, for instance, mandatory minimums, truth in 
sentencing, and three-strike laws (Shapiro 2010).  The 'war on drugs' represents a secure flow of 
profits for private prisons, which means that lobbying for  strict incarceration laws becomes 
part of the profit-maximizing strategy for these private firms (Hall 2013).  With little focus on 
training and rehabilitation and an incentive not to provide it, prisons can rely increasingly on 
repeat business in the form of recidivism.   
Once a government contract has been awarded even under an open bid system, the 
government becomes locked into that contract past its duration due to the inertia of path 
dependence.  With respect to the private prison industry, given the ‘natural monopoly’ start-up 
costs, there simply are not many private firms competing for the government’s business.  The 
government becomes locked into relationships with private prison firms regardless of 
performance simply because it has no alternative.  
Core enabling myth #2:  government regulations pose undue burdens on business, insuring what good 
business practice and competitive markets will automatically enforce 
The neoliberal imperative of 'deregulation' is a misnomer – a myth – because the 
ultimate aim of neoliberal advocates specifically and capital more generally is the paring away of 
specific regulation that impedes the movement of capital while maintaining interventions that 
support or create markets.  Regulatory restructuring, whereby industries are trusted to self-
regulate or provide in-house experts to advise policy makers is another way in which neoliberal 
advocates are able to mold the state into the type of regulator it needs (Peck 2001).  While 
neoliberal advocates claim that market forces will act as the ultimate regulator, in reality, fewer 
regulations allow established businesses to manipulate competition, and in the case of the 
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financial industry, to expand recklessly, creating a fragile network of inter-connected operations 
increasingly vulnerable to crisis.      
 The financial industry takes no issue with regulations which might provide assistance 
during a crisis.  Regulations which require banks to join the FDIC, for example, have not been 
protested.  Likewise, legal pathways for the government to intervene directly during a crisis 
remain intact and have grown in tandem with the deregulation push since the 1980s.  
Deregulation advocates also fail to challenge those policy tools that attempt to smooth 
turbulent financial waters, such as interest rate manipulation, short term measures enacted by 
the Fed to provide liquidity to institutions, or the Fed as lender of last resort (Campbell 2012).   
Clearly, financial institutions want to minimize rules on operation while maximizing the safety 
net in the likely event that unruly behavior leads to a crisis.   
While efforts to deregulate within the financial industry began prior to the rise of 
neoliberalism (see Campbell 2012), deregulation efforts escalated as neoliberalism became 
more popular in political circles.  Explosive growth in financial innovations follows financial 
deregulation, especially in the creation of newly imagined and highly complex financial 
instruments.  With fewer rules and no regulations in place to leash these new financial 
instruments, boom-bust cycles have become more pronounced since the 1980s.  These crises 
have been encouraged by reliable government bailouts, creating a continual chain reaction:  
financial deregulation to financial innovation to crises to bailout to further financial 
expansion, which cycles through again, each iteration expanding the financial sector.  The 
larger the financial sector, the more frightening is the spectre of financial crisis, and the more 
willing and eager the government becomes to assist and bail-out (Crotty 2003). 
 The rationale for deregulation rests on the faith that capital markets can most 
efficiently and accurately assess risk and return, and price securities accordingly.  Financial 
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market operatives, it is still believed, are best situated and possess enough expertise to police 
themselves.  Since, according to the neoliberal narrative, financial markets simply represent the 
aggregate of those well-informed financial operatives, the risk of financial crisis is mitigated and 
the myth of the healthy and free financial markets is substantiated (Crotty 2003). 
The moral hazard created with the removal of regulations combined with the tacit 
assurance of government rescue, essentially eliminates the need to account for risk.  In the 
years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, financial deregulation fed the derivation of more 
financial assets (Wahl 2011).  Each subsequent iteration of financial innovation created 
another layer of complexity in the operation of financial markets, further obfuscating the 
essential risk involved in their trading, and further distancing the connection between the 
physical asset from which the initial value emerged (Bresser-Pereira 2010).  Fee structures 
created incentives for financial officers to process in quantity regardless of quality, as fees were 
completely disconnected from the risk-return result.  Bonus structures incentivized profits 
which were generated on paper through leveraging, which embedded an incentive to take on 
more risk (Crotty 2003). Risk ran rampant.  Yet, when the 2008 crisis hit, a stock answer from 
neoliberal non-apologists was that the crisis was caused by whatever remnants of regulation 
were still in place; in short, the answer is even more deregulation (Wahl 2011).  
Core enabling myth #3:  given the choice, people prefer to live off welfare than work because no one wants 
to work. 
Neoliberalism is dependent upon the existence of the welfare state - in a specific form - 
that helps to create and sustain flexible labor markets and defray the cost to capital of 
providing a living wage.  Neoliberalism is also dependent upon anti-welfare rhetoric that 
socializes the public on the merits of individual responsibility and the evils of the undeserving 
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poor (Hartman 2005).   Nowhere is this more evident than in the replacement of welfare with 
so-called ‘workfare’ policies. 
The term ‘workfare’ as an alternative to welfare premiered in a 1969 televised speech by 
then-President Nixon.  The workfare concept gained momentum through the Reagan years, 
but it wasn’t until the Clinton presidency that workfare became codified into law with the 
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (Peck 1998). During his years in 
office, Clinton achieved greater gains in neutering the social safety net than his Republican 
predecessors.  The transformation was not subtle:  TANF replaced AFDC, welfare became 
‘workfare,’ assistance became surveillance, the social safety net morphed into permanent job 
insecurity, and the welfare caseload in the US shrunk by more than half (Platt 2003).  
Workfare represents the culmination of neoliberal efforts from re-shaping popular perception 
and political framing to its canonization into law.     
 The neoliberal welfare state uses workfare conditionalities, including training and 
compulsory work requirements, to create flexible labor markets (Prasch 2011).  The supply of 
no-contract or temporary (precarious) jobs swells as recipients must take any job to qualify for 
benefits, while the number of full-time, full benefits positions, which are more expensive to 
capital, dwindles.  Workfare requirements thus also weaken the position of unionized workers 
(Platt 2003).  The training requirements of workfare essentially mean that the cost of training is 
outsourced from the company to either the state or the individual.  Morevoer, welfare benefits 
help capital by defraying private labor costs; if individuals are not paid a living wage, it falls to 
the state to make up the difference (MacLeavy 2010).   
 The more the welfare state is scaled back, the more disciplined all workers become:  as 
job insecurity looms larger, workers afraid of losing their jobs are also afraid to demand higher 
wages, better working conditions, or join unions (Piven 1998).  The scaling back of welfare 
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benefits and the strengthening of workfare conditionalities rather than the complete 
elimination of the welfare state creates a dual labor market with a disciplined, non-unionized 
workforce occupying a shrinking number of positions and a growing secondary tier with 
precarious employment (MacLeavy 2010). 
Workfare also perpetuates the convenient myth that people receiving state assistance 
must be forced to work (Hartman 2005).  Along with creating greater job insecurity, the 
cultural perception of welfare recipients as unconditional ‘takers’ is reinforced; the working 
poor construct a demon out of the welfare poor (Piven 1998). 
In the 1990s, the patronizing perception of the irresponsible single mother on welfare 
was codified into law, most notably through the 1996 TANF legislation which restricted 
benefit access, requiring for example that teenage mothers live with adult relatives and attempt 
to establish paternity (Gilbert 2009).  Under the regime of workfare, access to benefits is strictly 
regulated by conditions of compliance which subject the individual to routine invasions of 
privacy and surveillance of the state (Hartman 2005).   
Attempts to legislate welfare state recipients into approved moral behavior 
communicates that welfare recipients are not able to govern their own passions.  The villainy of 
welfare recipients creates a locus for blame for the failings of neoliberalism generally and for 
(putative) overspending by the state more specifically while insuring silence as individuals are 
loathe to identify themselves.  The illusion of social cohesion is maintained as the silenced 
welfare recipients still participate in the labor market and still consume goods - although both 
precariously - while society gets a hazily defined person to blame (Hartman 2005).  Cultural 
perceptions of the moral inferiority of welfare recipients fuel the social movements supporting 
the retrenchment of the welfare state.  Individuals fail to see the inverse relationship between 
the size of the social safety net and the level of job insecurity (Piven 1998). 
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Concluding remarks 
 Regimes are not reducible to a single ideology, nor will any ideological practice be pure.  
The longer view, however suggests a regime would move back toward ideological purity as the 
heat of any immediate crisis fades.  Systemic incongruence between the ideology and reality is 
an entirely different matter; herein we find hypocrisy, double standards, corruption, and 
outright lies.   
This analysis of the neoliberal narrative is not meant to suggest that there is a 
comprehensive and complete ‘Neoliberal Agenda’ that is actively enforced by maniacal powers-
that-be, conspiring to deceive the masses through an elaborate web of lies.  Instead, we see 
powerful interests repeating a simple mantra – individual responsibility – in a variety of ways, 
while taking whatever action suits their immediate needs.  From this emerges the ideological 
narrative of neoliberalism.   
The neoliberal narrative consists of that simple, ideological construct of hyper-
individualism, upon which the justification of its core organizing myths rests, such that the 
consequences of the neoliberal narrative become much greater than the unifying principle on 
which it stands.  The ethos of hyper-individualism systematically dismantles the power of 
collective action for the general population while protecting the power of collective action 
among and across corporate entities, industries, or the interests of capital writ large. 
The rhetoric of deregulation argues that the state should leave the private sector alone – that 
each individual firm in responding to market forces will execute the will of the people, while 
privatization argues that individual firms can accomplish with greater efficiency what the 
collective resources of the state cannot.  The rhetoric which rails against the welfare state 
undermines any sense of shared, communal responsibility.  Never mind the collective lobbying 
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efforts expended by firms and industries that quietly campaign for legislation and state 
assistance in order to survive the very market exigencies that individuals should face alone.    
The continued success of the neoliberal narrative is due in part to the easy villains it 
creates and the easy solutions if offers:  deregulate, privatize, cut ‘entitlements.’  The mismatch 
between rhetoric and reality, however, creates a cognitive dissonance that might be difficult for 
the individual to articulate but that can also quietly catalyze unfocused resistance.  If we hope 
to redesign our social institutions into structures which support the flourishing of individuals 
and broader society, then we must unveil and debunk these enabling myths through immanent 
critique – before we can convince someone of an inconvenient truth, we must first help them 
to see the convenient myth. 
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